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Abstract
Although bidders in an internet auction do not obtain the actual
ownership of the item during the auction, they still act according to
an endowment eﬀect. In a unique data set of 17,000 Danish furniture
auctions I ﬁnd that having the leading bid, both in terms of time and
dollars, will aﬀect the bidders probability to rebid if outbid. Thus,
expectations to own, i.e. “pseudo-endowment”, seem to aﬀect bidders’
willingness to pay in a relative fast and straightforward manor. Gener-
ally, these data therefore support that the reference point, from which
we measure losses and gains, is closely related to expectations.
Keywords: Internet auctions, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Endow-
ment Eﬀect, bidding behavior, eBay, WTP, Reference Point.
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1 Introduction
Bidding behavior in real auctions can often from an economist’s point of
view look mysterious. The rational equilibrium strategy of game theory
looks nothing like the strategy and behavior that is often observed. There
are many examples of how bidders “get caught” in the game and end up
paying too much. Especially in Internet auctions, like eBay, this has been
documented (Ariely and Simonsen, 2003; Lee and Malmendier, 2006). At
ﬁrst glance you might simply conclude that bidders must have some kind
of “auction fever”. However, developments in Behavioral Economics could
perhaps assists us when trying to understand some of this behavior.
One possible explanation is based on the endowment eﬀect originally sug-
gested by Thaler (1980). Once you own an item, selling it will feel like a
loss whereas the money you receive in return is viewed as a gain. Thus,
as people generally dislike losses considerably more than they like the same
sized gains, the item will often be worth more to you when selling it as op-
posed to buying it. This was nicely demonstrated by Kahneman et al. (1990)
where randomly distributed mugs had an average selling price of approx. $7
whereas the corresponding buying price was approximately $3.
Bidders do not obtain the actual ownership of the item during an auction.
Still, they can get a feeling of ownership – especially if they have the leading
bid. A feeling that could make them behave as if they were the actual
owners. And if outbid a feeling of loss which could make them increase their
bids. The question I ask in this article is therefore, if pseudo-endowment
from having the leading bid will eﬀect the bidders’ probability to increase
their bids if outbid?
This article presents evidence that bidders do in fact react according to such
a pseudo-endowment eﬀect. In a unique data set of 17,000 internet auctions
for modern furniture the probability to increase a ﬁrst max-bid when outbid
depends positively on two measures of ownership; 1) the amount of time
as the leading bidder and 2) the optimism measured as the depth from the
bidder’s max-bid to the current price in the auction. Moreover, these eﬀects
are marginally decreasing so that small amounts of time or/and depth are
more important for the feeling of ownership. Theoretically, these results
hint at the process of setting a reference point from which a decision maker
measures losses and gains.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical founda-
tions of a pseudo-endowment. Section 3 describes the data and selects the
relevant bids. Rebidding is analyzed in Section 4 and Section 5 discusses
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and concludes.
2 Pseudo-Endowment
Reference-Dependent Preferences is the basic theory underlying a possible
pseudo-endowment eﬀect. As presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
in their famous paper of Prospect Theory, people do generally think in rel-
ative rather than absolute terms which, for economic decisions, mean that
outcomes are usually compared to some reference – The Reference Point.
This is in fact in many settings a very clever way to utilize our cognitive
capacity very eﬃciently (Kahneman, 2003). However, since we dislike losses
much more than we like the same sized gains the reference point can be-
come very important for our decision making – not always in a positive
way.. This has been demonstrated in a wide range of settings from small
scale consumer decisions to large scale lifestyle decisions (See e.g. Tversky
and Griﬃn (1991) and Frederick and Loewenstein (1999)).
Although the theory has proven its validity and relevance through a vast
number of experiments in the last thirty years, a problem remains before the
theory can become a reliable tool for market analysis and policy making. The
exact reference point is in many settings ambiguous. In principle, you can
therefore get almost any prediction if you set the reference point accordingly.
Early in the literature the reference point was either explicitly controlled or
simply taken as the current endowment, hence the resulting “endowment ef-
fect”. This is a very reasonable assumption in laboratory experiments were
the endowment is the variable at stake and in focus of the subjects. Yet,
actual endowments are not necessarily the reference point from which we
measure losses and gains. Sen and Johnson (1997), for example, demon-
strate how possessing a coupon for a product can increase the preference
for that product. Another experiment by Carmon et al. (2003) shows how
prior presentation of one choice alternative increases the preference for that
alternative in a later choice. They both interpret this as a change in the
reference point such that choosing something else would feel like a loss.
Later developments in the theory have emphasized the role of Recent Ex-
pectations as the reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). If you expect
to receive a wage increase of $3,000 it is likely that you get disappointed
and feel like you have incurred a loss if the actual wage increase ends up
being $1,000 – even though it essentially is a gain to your current wage.
Pseudo-endowment1 is therefore when people expect to get to own some-
1Although Ariely, Heyman and Orhun (2004) use the term quasi-endowment for the
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thing without actually owning it yet. However, expectations as such do not
solve the problem of specifying the reference point as they too are often
unknown.
One solution to this problem is the well-known method of assuming rational
expectations. Applied to decision making it means that decision makers
choose their expectations such that they will follow through on their plans
and fulﬁl these expectations2. But like rational expectations in general, this
assumption seems to be rather unrealistic. When bidders get involved in an
auction and end up paying more than initially intended, this is indeed an
example of how people do not follow through on their initial plans. From a
theoretical point of view this article is therefore part of the eﬀort to clarify
how the reference point is constructed in real market settings.
3 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction house based primarily in Denmark, but with ac-
tivities in Germany, Noway, and Sweden. All their auctions are internet
auctions much like eBay.com, but there are some important diﬀerences. Lau-
ritz.com is not only an internet site, but also a physical auction house with
18 locations (2007) where the goods are located and available for inspection
during business hours. Potential bidders therefore have the opportunity to
examine the goods thoroughly before bidding. Moreover, Lauritz.com was
a traditional auction house before 2000 and has kept the tradition of mak-
ing an expert estimate of the value of the items. Both of these features
contribute to minimize the information about quality from other people’s
bidding. Thus theoretically there should be no reason for bidders to re-bid.
The particular data I have access to are from all the modern furniture auc-
tions in 2005 which amounts to about 37,000 auctions3. More speciﬁcally,
I have access to the complete bidding histories, i.e. exact time of bids and
bidders’ ID number etc., much like the available information on any eBay
auction just after expiry4. From these histories I can backtrack the bidders’
actual bids (as max-bids) and when they were submitted.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses and especially
feeling of ownership in auctions, pseudo-endowment was used by Prelec (1990) to describe
this general idea.
2This is the so-called Personal Equilibrium of Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
3In modern furniture there are two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables
and chairs (71%).
4The data used for this article is therefore in principle publicly available. I did, however,
receive the data directly from Lauritz.com with a few extras which is not used here.
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Lauritz.com have branded themselves as reselling classic Scandinavian furni-
ture designs. While Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market
in 2005, this was a period of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have
therefore limited my analysis to the 27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an
analysis of rebidding, I need at least two bidders for one of them to face a
question of rebidding. Excluding some extreme auctions brings the number
of auctions down to 16,8645.
The typical auction procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest
auction house where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is satisﬁed
with the valuation and the probable sale Lauritz.com puts it on the internet
site with auction expiration exactly one week later6. By policy none of the
auctions have a reserve price, but the ﬁrst available bid is $50 (2005) since
this will cover the minimum fee to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally the
seller pays 10% of the reached auction price (if above $500), and the buyer
must pay additionally 20% plus a ﬁxed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either bid for the next available bid (the
current price plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $10) or use the
max-bid service (proxy bidder) and let the auction site bid for you. In
economic terms bidders can therefore bid as if it was a normal ﬁrst price
ascending auction, or as if it was a sort of second price auction by putting
in their maximum bid. This bidding procedure is very close to the proxy
bidding system used on eBay, only the max-bids are also restricted to the
increments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes the auction
is extended with 3 minutes. Thus, this is a so-called soft ending with always
at least 3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over the winner can pick up the item at the physical
auction house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the
rather peculiar feature that buyers can regret and return the item within
two weeks. Although this feature could potentially aﬀect the bidding, it
does not present a problem to this analysis8.
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also there are
a few auctions with an error in the time of start that subsequently have been altered by
mistake, so they have been removed. These are the same auctions as used in Bramsen
(2008) except for 212 auction. In these two bidders have enter a max-bid in the exact same
second, which my procedure for backtracking bids cannot handle. These 212 auctions have
therefore also been excluded
6To even out the load some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening,
but almost all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auctions
all have a duration of 7 days +/- 6 hours.
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK, but they have here
been converted to USD where $1 = DKK 5 (2008).
8If there is uncertainty about WTP it can potentially make it less costly to bid too
much if you can regret. However, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is
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The vast majority of the auctions are unique at the time of sale. Surely there
are some repetitions and classic furniture that are sold in greater numbers,
but it is rare to ﬁnd competing items at a given time. With distinctive
items that are professionally valuated and the soft ending Lauritz.com is a
unique internet auction environment where almost all of the practical and
game theoretic arguments for bidding late are absent. From a neoclassical
point of view bidders who enter their willingness to pay (WTP) as a max-bid
sometime during the auction should therefore have no reason to rebid.
4 Selecting the relevant bids
Bidders may have diﬀerent strategies and not all bids are therefore relevant.
Most bidders bid as if it was a normal English auction by simply bidding
the next available bid. In fact, this practice seems to be the dominating
behavior as 50.4% of all the bidders’ ﬁrst bid is simply the next available
increment. Other bidders follow a sniping strategy bidding only during the
last minutes. It is impossible to know when these bidders actually reveal
their underlying WTP. Therefore it is also impossible to ﬁnd out if and why
they increase it. Hence, the only feasible approach is to exclude all the bids
that are unlikely to reveal the true underlying WTP. Fortunately, the data
set is large enough to enable a critically selection of only the relevant bids.
The ﬁrst step in this selection process is to disregard winning bids. Only
if the bidder is outbid there is reason to rebid. The next step is to select
only the ﬁrst bid by a bidder and thus analyze the probability for rebidding
a second time. Surely, it could also be relevant to investigate factors which
aﬀect rebidding a third or a fourth time, but a comparison between e.g. a
second and a third rebid will be problematic both to analyze and interpret.
Thus, with the greater amount of ﬁrst bids these are the most optimal to
analyze.
Focusing on the ﬁrst bid also have other advantages. If a bidder does not
want to put in her real WTP, but something lower, this is easier to discover
from the ﬁrst bid compared to a second bid as the distance between the
WTP and the current auction price will be greater for the ﬁrst bid. For
instance, if a bid is only 30% of the valuation made by Lauritz.com it is
diﬃcult to believe that it is a true representation of the bidder’s WTP.
their WTP. It must therefore be the same underlying mechanisms that aﬀect bidding with
or without this option. Furthermore, there are transaction costs and only a very limited
number does actually use the option (in this data, 6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where
a bidder can ignore the purchase perhaps with a black listing as consequence, bidding on
Lauritz.com seems to be more committing.
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Following this logic, below is a list of restrictions which are designed to
rule out any ﬁrst bid which is unlikely to represent the true WTP of the
bidder. The exact limits to these restriction are naturally rather arbitrary.
On the one hand a very tough restriction is preferable in order to limit our
attention only to the relevant bids, but on the other hand excluding too
many observations might weaken the generality of the results. In appendix
A I report a sensitivity analysis for the limits. Basically this shows that the
restrictions are not simply data mining and that the results are generally
valid for these data.
Too low a bid. If a bidder places a bid below 60% of the ﬁnal price there
are to possibilities. Either this is not a serious representation of the
true WTP or this bidder does in fact have a very low valuation com-
pared to other bidders. By excluding low bids the analysis will possibly
be biased towards the behavior of bidders with high valuations. How-
ever these are usually the bidders who are important for the auction
outcome and in some sense a possible bias is therefore beneﬁcial.
Just the next increment. If bidders at entry simply take the next avail-
able bid there are again two possibilities.The next bid just happens
to be the true WTP, or it is simply because this bidder is using the
auction as a simple English auction (as around half the bidders do).
The latter seems to be overwhelmingly likely. Still, excluding the few
true WTP will possibly screen out more late ﬁrst bids as the price is
likely to be higher at the time. This will to some extend, however, be
taken into account by controlling for the time of entry.
Excluding professionals. In the literature experience and professional
motives are observed to diminish the endowment eﬀect, see e.g. List
(2003). Excluding bidders that bid at more than 20 auctions dur-
ing 2005 will therefore get us closer to the underlying psychological
processes that might happen for a “normal” individual.
Too high a second bid. If your second bid is more than 20% higher than
the ﬁrst bid, the ﬁrst bid is not likely to be the true WTP. Although
the endowment eﬀect might be a powerful mechanism I do not believe
that it will change the WTP dramatically from one bid to the other
as the comparison eﬀect of paying more will also kick in9.
Too many bids. More than 5 bids from a bidder signals that the ﬁrst
bid was not a true representation of the WTP, but rather part of
9Bidders will not only be loss averse against loosing the item, but also towards paying
more than expected. This was formulated as the comparison eﬀect by Koszegi and Rabin
(2006)
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a strategy. It could of course happen that the bidder is provoked
(outbid) to reevaluate the WTP a large number of times. Still, this
would be a rare case and in my opinion it will not bias the outcome
to leave these out.
Too fast a second bid. Changing the bid within a short period could be
an indication of competition and pure “auction fever”. Furthermore,
as argued below rebidding within a short period is not likely to be
response to a real change in underlying preferences. Bids which are
rebid within 4 hours, will therefore be excluded10. However, as this
turns out to be a key restriction, I will discuss this in more detail in
the analysis.
It is of course impossible to ensure that all the remaining bids are represent-
ing the true underlying WTP. Still, in my opinion, these restrictions will
facilitate that the dominating behavior behind rebidding are real changes in
the preferences.
5 Analysis
Does pseudo-endowment from the ﬁrst bid have an aﬀect on a bidder’s prob-
ability to bid a second time if outbid? That is the basic question in this
article. My answer goes through a logit regression. More speciﬁcally, if yi is
a binary variable being 1 if the bidder rebids in observation i rebids and 0 if
the bidder does not rebid, then yi can be described by a binomial distribu-
tion where yi ∼ B(1, pi) for i = 1, .., N . I assume that pi can be described
using a logit model speciﬁed as:
ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
= f(pseudo-endowmenti) + g(controlsi) + i
where i is a random stochastic variable. In the analysis I will apply diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of pseudo-endowment indicated by f(), but there are also other
factors which could explain the rebidding. In order to get unbiased results,
and also to get the best possible ﬁt, all such variables need to be part of the
logistic regression. I will use these controls in the simplest possible model.
Thus, g() will be a linear function specifying all control variables. Below is
a list of the controls11:
10The closer to ﬁnish the faster you may update your reference point. One idea could
be to construct this restrictions in such a way that the closer to expiry the smaller break.
However, bidding the last day and rebidding again soon after could also be an indication
of auction fever. I will therefore not vary this restriction.
11Summary statistics of the controls can be found in Appendix A
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Time of entry If a bidder is looking for some special item she is more
likely to ﬁnd it earlier in the auction period than bidders who are just
randomly searching. Hence, early bidders might have higher WTP.
This is in itself not a problem if the bidder really bids her maximum
WTP. However, as the price is likely to be lower early in the auction
this can act as an anchor depressing the ﬁrst bid. The probability to
rebid could for this reason be higher.
Experience Bidders on Lauritz.com do not have ratings like on eBay. In
stead I can directly count how many times they participate in modern
furniture auctions during 2005. Although I exclude the bidders which
participate in more than 20 auctions (“The professionals”), some ex-
perience might also diminish the pseudo-endowment eﬀect and the
tendency to rebid.
Valuation As mentioned in section 3 Lauritz.com lists an estimate of the
ﬁnal price to guide both the sellers and the buyers. For expensive
items (e.g. with a valuation of $4000) bidders might hesitate to put
in their true WTP. As a consequence they might be more inclined to
increase their bid later in the auction.
Price at entry Arelative low price at entry compared to the actual value
(the ﬁnal price) might depress the bidders entry bid – just as a high
valuation or early bids could do. Again this will make a rebid more
likely.
5.1 Duration of ownership
Recall that pseudo-endowment was deﬁned in section 2 as expectations to
buy. Although “expectations” sounds simple it is a complex cognitive con-
struction which is impossible to quantify directly. One simple approach is to
ignore the expectations per se and focus on another necessary component:
The amount of time used to form these expectations.
That time could be an important factor is exactly why internet auctions
are of particular interest. During the typical auction that lasts a full week
there is plenty of time for bidders to get used to the idea of buying and
incorporate this into their expectations.
Empirical support for this idea can be found in Strahilevitz and Loewenstein
(1998) where the endowment eﬀect is signiﬁcantly increased with longer
periods of ownership. Even more related is the laboratory experiment by
Ariely, Heyman and Orhun (2004). In a simulated auction they show how
bidders bid signiﬁcantly higher if they have pseudo-ownership, i.e. if they
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have the leading bid for several bidding rounds as compared to a single bid
with no ownership12.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
Intercept -0.43*** -0.73*** -0.49***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09)
Time of entry -0.087*** -0.071*** -0.056***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016)
Experience -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Valuation 0.00013* 0.00013* 0.00013*
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Price at entry -0.40** -0.36** -0.28*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
t 0.004 0.75***
(0.026) (0.12)
t2 -0.30***
(0.05)
t3 0.03***
(0.01)
ln(t) 0.047***
(0.007)
-2Loglikelihood 6913.1 6865.7 6864.6
Signiﬁcant codes: *** ≤0.001, ** ≤0.01, * ≤0.05
Null deviance (-2L): 6997.5 on 6092 degrees of freedom
Table 1: Logit regressions on the eﬀect of the leading bid in days
The ﬁrst proxy for pseudo-endowment I will deploy is therefore the duration
in days as the leading bidder from the ﬁrst bid. I denote this measure
t. Table 1 shows the results for three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the logit
regression. For all parameters in the speciﬁc model the estimates are shown
with signiﬁcance levels. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. As
indicated by the Loglikelihood values the best ﬁt is found with a formulation
of f(t) = ln(t) in Model 1c.
From Table 1 it can be diﬃcult to see the actual eﬀect of being the leading
bidder and in Figure 1 is the predicted eﬀect of t (black solid line), and
95% conﬁdence interval (dashed) for the median bidder. A median bidder
participates in a furniture auction 5 times in 2005, enters at day 5.44, the
12A similar test on real auction data is performed by Wolf et al. (2005). They ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of duration as the leading bidder on the probability to re-bid, but the eﬀect
is not signiﬁcant. However, eBay data is generally problematic as there are also other
reasons (e.g. common value) for increasing the bid.
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Figure 1: Predicted eﬀect of having the leading bid
valuation of the item $400, and the price at entry turned out to be 30% of
the ﬁnal price.
That ln(t) is the best ﬁt compared to for instance a quadratic or cubic form
suggests a high initial eﬀect that will slowly fade13. In other words, these
initial results suggest that most of the shift in reference point happens during
the ﬁrst 6 hours after the actual change in probabilities.
Both the level of probabilities and the magnitude of the pseudo-endowment
eﬀect depend on the controlling variables14. Figure 1 also shows the es-
timates for a bidder which only participated once (The novice) and for a
bidder which participates 15 times this year (The experienced). Compared
to the median bidder the data can therefore conﬁrm the hypothesis that
more experience diminish the probability to rebid and indirectly also the
pseudo-endowment eﬀect. Similarly, Table 1 shows that high valuation low
price at entry, and early entry will increase the probability to rebid. All the
controls therefore have the expected signs.
As mentioned in section 3 the result is rather dependent on the last selection
criteria, i.e. excluding fast rebidding. In fact, if this selection criterion is
ignored and more of the rebids are made within a few minutes the eﬀect
13The results of other speciﬁcations can be obtained from the author upon request.
14With the simple functional form is it not possible to distinguish between direct eﬀect
on probabilities and an eﬀect through t.
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of t is reversed. Table 2 shows the coeﬃcients of ln(t) in logit regressions
with a less strict restriction. This reveals that if rebids within less than 6
minutes are allowed these fast rebids will dominate the sample and the eﬀect
of pseudo-ownership disappears. This illustrates a clear distinction between
Restriction 2 min 6 min 15 min 1 hour 4 hours
Coeﬃcient -0.026 0.000 0.015 0.030 0.047
N 7309 6984 6741 6462 6093
Table 2: Including fast rebidding
auction fever and the pseudo-endowment eﬀect. I speculate that auction
fever is when bidders get aroused and caught in a bidding competition. If
bidders rebid within only a few minutes this must be an indication of auction
fever as opposed to a real change in underlying preferences. That is exactly
what the data shows. From this perspective, I think this ﬁnding supports
the idea of pseudo-endowment.
5.2 Optimism
Although time is an important factor in changing the reference point I take
this analysis one step further and focus directly on the expectations to buy.
Expectations must be related to the bidders’ beliefs about winning. Hence,
from a logical point of view other factors to consider are the factors which
could aﬀects the bidders’ subjective probability to win.
Imagine that bidders are rational in their beliefs about winning. What
would then be a reasonable model of their subjective probability to win?
This approach is taken by Bramsen (2007) where the bidding behavior of a
Reference-Dependent bidder is modeled. Basically, the probability to win is
based on some underlying probability distribution of prices which is updated
during the auction. At a given time the probability to win can therefore be
calculated as the cumulative probabilities to win below the bidders max-bid.
Naturally, we do not know the bidders’ underlying beliefs about probabili-
ties. Still, the perceived probability to win must be a function of the distance
from the current price to the max-bid. If for instance the bidder places a
max-bid of $1000 she must be more optimistic about the chance to win if
the current price in the auction is $200 as compared to $900. This distance
or “depth” of pseudo-ownership is therefore a proxy for optimism and hence
another measure of the amount of pseudo-endowment.
To illustrate this measure consider Figure 2. Here the bidder puts in a
max-bid of $1000 at a point where the current price is $270. The leading
12
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bidder at this point has a max-bid of $400 which causes the current price
to change immediately to $420 (the next increment). The initial depth can
therefore be expressed as the distance between $1000 and $420. During the
duration of ownership a couple of other bidders enter new bids which cause
the current price to increase and the depth to decrease. At the point where
a bidder bids $1040 (the increment above $1000) or more the leading bid is
lost.
Figure 2 also illustrates that for many bidders the level of optimism will de-
crease during pseudo-ownership. Bidders will most likely observe the depth
at some points in time during this period of pseudo-ownership, but it is
impossible to know exactly when. As a general measure I will therefore use
the expected depth at a random time. This corresponds to using a weighted
average of the depth. I will denote this d¯.
There is one problem with using depth as the proxy for optimism. When the
depth is zero, i.e. the current price equals the max-bid of the bidder there
is still a chance to win. Yet in a regression there is no diﬀerence between
zero as in zero depth, and zero, as in outbid. To solve this problem I will
therefore use a dummy if the bidders max-bid equals the current price. This
dummy will be assigned a possible eﬀect of ownership with zero depth.
In Table 3 the results of the four diﬀerent logit regressions using ln(t) and d¯
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in various ways are reported. Again, a logistic transformation of d¯ has the
best ﬁt as in model 2b15. In model 2c I also include an interaction eﬀect,
but this is not signiﬁcant. Initially I therefore conclude that model 2b to be
the best model.
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d
Intercept -0.72*** -1.46*** -1.37*** -1.40***
(0.10) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15)
Time of entry -0.0036 -0.0009 -0.0039 0.0006
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0183)
Experience -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Valuation 0.000023 0.000018 0.000013 0.000031
(0.000071) (0.000068) (0.000068) (0.000062)
Price at entry -0.25 -0.29* -0.31* -0.29*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
ln(t) 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.25**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
d¯ 0.00025***
(0.00007)
ln(d¯) 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03)
ln(t)*ln(d¯) -0.02
(0.01)
ln(t · d¯) 0.14***
(0.02)
Dummy 1.36*** 2.03*** 3.49*** 2.03***
(0.28) (0.32) (0.98) (0.32)
-2Loglikelihood 6829.4 6820.5 6818.0 6820.8
Signiﬁcant codes: *** ≤0.001, ** ≤0.01, * ≤0.05
Null deviance (-2L): 6997.5 on 6092 degrees of freedom
Table 3: Logit regressions on the eﬀect of time and depth
Figure 3a illustrates the predicted values and 95% conﬁdence intervals of
model 2b for the median bidder with a duration of ownership of 19.5 hours.
In addition to this eﬀect there is often a link between low depth and short
duration of ownership. Thus, the eﬀect of low depth will often be enhanced
by short ownership16.
15If the average depth is zero I replace ln(d¯) = −Inf with zero. Hence the eﬀect of
depth will be assigned to the dummy.
16Similarly will the dummy also be correlated to short duration of ownership. It is
therefore diﬃcult to interpret the exact eﬀect of the dummy. What is important is the
sign of the eﬀect as this suggests that having no depth, but still ownership will have a
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Adding depth to the regression, i.e. expand model 1c to 2b, increases the
eﬀect of duration substantially. Figure 3b illustrates the eﬀect of having the
leading bid for the median bidder with an average depth of $28. However, a
little caution must be made because of the dummy, and a direct comparison
is not possible. Still, the fact that the eﬀect does not decrease must indicate
that depth does not take any of the explanatory power away from dura-
tion. In other words, depth seems to be an entirely additional component
of pseudo-endowment not explained by the duration.
0
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
$40 $80 $120 $160 $200
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
(a) Eﬀect of leading the bid in dollars (d¯)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
(b) Eﬀect from leading the bid in days (t)
Figure 3: Intentions at Entry and Pocket Money
Another observation for model 2b is that the estimated coeﬃcient for ln(d¯),
βˆ
d¯
= 0.16, is very close to that of ln(t). This raises the question if βt = βd¯ as
in model 2d. A likelihood ratio test comparing model 2b and 2d shows that
this hypothesis cannot be rejected (p=0.58). An alternative description of
the pseudo-endowment eﬀect is therefore βln(t)+βln(d¯) = βln(t · d¯). Hence,
the change in reference point must be closely related to the area t · d¯, which
is another way of describing the total area between the max-bid and the
current auction price in Figure 2.
Although I use the weighted average of depth as the proxy for optimism,
another reasonable hypothesis is that depth right after entry would have
greater importance for the bidders’ optimism than a random time. Yet, the
estimated coeﬃcient for an additional variable measuring initial depth is
not signiﬁcant. This hypothesis can therefore not be supported17. Another
hypothesis is that a large depth late in the period of ownership will increase
the loss of paying more and make the bidder less likely to rebid. But again
positive eﬀect on the probability to rebid compared to no ownership at all.
17I measure the depth after 1 or 5 minutes after entry.
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this cannot be supported by the data18. Thus, it seems as if the best possible
proxy for optimism is the weighted average depth. In other word, the feeling
of ownership is directly related to the logarithm of the total area between
the current price and the max-bid no matter the shape.
This observation summarizes the results in a simple and illustrative model.
First of all, optimism and duration can substitute each other in a straight-
forward manner. For instance, lower depth can be compensated with longer
duration as the leading bidder. Also, a relative less optimistic start can
be compensated if there is less decrease in optimism later in the period of
pseudo-ownership.
Another intuitive aspect is the diminishing sensitivity on the reference point
in both dimensions. More pseudo-ownership, both in dollars and in duration,
will lead to an increase in the pseudo-endowment eﬀect, but the eﬀect is
marginally decreasing.
6 Discussion
You do not get the actual ownership after a bid in internet auctions. Nev-
ertheless, this analysis suggests that there is an endowment eﬀect of being
the leading bidder, i.e. a pseudo-endowment eﬀect. For the subset of bids
which is likely to represent WTP, both time as leading bidder and optimism
about chances to win is facilitating that a bidder is getting attached to the
item and thus willing to pay more when outbid. This study therefore con-
ﬁrms two hypotheses about the creation of a reference point; 1) that it takes
some “getting used to” before people adjust to new beliefs and 2) that the
reference point, at least to some extend, is based upon rational beliefs about
future outcomes.
For those not impressed by the magnitude of the pseudo-endowment eﬀect
found in these data, this might only be the tip of the iceberg. Many people
do not enter the auction until the last minute, perhaps as part of a strategy.
But in my opinion they will still form expectation about their chance to
win at a given bid which they are going to place. In fact, if they do not
enter, the current price will be lower so they might even get more optimistic
about their chance to win. Thus, some of the behavior I disregard as auction
fever due to fast rebidding could in reality be caused by pseudo-endowment
18Nor a measure of depth ﬁve minutes before outbid or a measure of necessary increase
in the payment from ﬁve minutes before outbid to ﬁve minutes after have signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in a logit regression. These analysis can be provided by the author upon
request.
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created before entering.
Naturally, the data is noisy and it might be a bit hastily to conclude in details
how the reference point is created. In the time dimension the marginally
decreasing speed of adjustment could simply be a result of the natural focus
of the bidders. Just after placing the bid the bidder is likely to think a lot
about the auction and therefore adjust the reference point relatively fast.
However, the speed of adjustment will vary a lot between the bidders and
depend on the speciﬁc situation19. Still, as a general model for the reference
point the marginally decreasing speed of adjustment might not be a bad
starting point. A reasonable model for this could e.g. be the lagged model
of Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) where new beliefs partly replace the
reference point of last period.
Pseudo-endowment might only be one of the factors aﬀecting a change in
preferences during the auction. For instance, if the bidders have price sen-
sitive preferences as suggested in Ariely, Koszegi, Mazar and Shampan’er
(2004), the rising price in itself will increase the WTP. Although this could
raise some doubt about the pseudo-endowment eﬀect, I think it mainly helps
to explain some of the additional noise in the data and the reason why some
of the bidders in the sample rebid more than once.
At a more general level the pseudo-endowment eﬀect found here supports the
fact that expectations play a major role for the reference point. Moreover,
the relatively fast eﬀect of entry suggests that a shift in reference point could
be relevant in many other settings. For instance, if you go shopping and see
something you fancy it is not at all unlikely that you will get attached to the
item and change your reference point in time to make the purchase despite
your initial objection to pay the price. Similarly, this could be the case in
many other settings where a seller, your employer, or even your family is
successful in aﬀecting your expectations. Thus, the endowment eﬀect can
prove to be relevant far beyond the initial applications.
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APPENDIX
A Sensitivity Analysis
An important point in the analysis is to select the bids which are credible to
be the bidders underlying WTP. In section 4 I present 5 restrictions which
are designed to screen away bids that is unlikely to be WTP. Below are four
tables which shows a sensitivity analysis for the ﬁrst four restrictions (the
last is treated in section 5.1). In my view they basically show that the result
is relative insensitive to the exact limits of the restrictions. In fact, you could
get larger coeﬃcients from other limits. Thus with these restrictions I have
tried to maximize the likelihood of observing WTP – not the coeﬃcients.
Restriction 1: To low a ﬁrst bid
≥ pct. of ﬁnal price 0 40% 60% 80%
Coeﬃcient for ln(t) 0.065 0.050 0.047 0.058
Number of obs 14886 9498 6093 2974
Restriction 2: First bid is just the next increment
Including increments Yes No
Coeﬃcient for ln(t) 0.031 0.047
Number of obs 9315 6093
Restriction 3: Excluding professionals
Participated in less than 10 20 50
Coeﬃcient for ln(t) 0.059 0.047 0.042
Number of obs 4605 6093 7780
Restriction 4: Maximum bid increase from ﬁrst to second bid
Bid Increase ≤ 10% 20% None
Coeﬃcient for ln(t) 0.043 0.047 0.051
Number of obs 5438 6093 6447
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B Summary statistics for controlling variables
In the logit regressions I apply some controlling variables in order to iso-
late the eﬀects of duration and depth of ownership. For the sample used
(N=6093) the summary statistics for these variables are:
Entry at (days) Participated Valuation P/V at entry
Min. : 0.0 1 200 0.00
1st Qu.: 3.3 2 300 0.18
Median : 5.5 5 400 0.30
3rd Qu.: 6.4 9 700 0.48
Max. : 7.2 19 4600 3.10
Mean : 4.8 6.3 559 0.35
More summary statistics on the data can be provide upon request.
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